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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK RIGGLE and 
H. RIGGLE, his wife, 
Plai1diffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
DAINES COM-
PANY, a partnership, D.R. DAINES, 
R. :\I. aucl .J. NORMAN 
DAINES, 




OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Snit for collection of the amount due on a promissory 
11ote. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
Tlw cansP was tried to the Court, the Honorable 
Hanson, J uclge. The Court entered judgment 
for the balance due on the promissory note in favor of 
tlw Plaintiffs and against the Defendants, Daines Manu-
facturing Company, a partnership, D. R. Daines and J. 
Xonnan Daines. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants - Appellants, :::wek to reverse the judg-
ment of the District Court. 
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs - Re:::;pondents, Frank Riggle and 
Geneva H. Riggle, are hereinafter ref en Pd to 
"Riggle", the DPfendants - Ap1wllants, Daines ?\IannfaC'-
tnring Company, a partnership, D. IL Daine:-; and .J. 
Norman Daines, are lwreinafter refrrred to as "Daines." 
This is an appeal from a jndguwnt grant<>d in th!' 
favor of Rigglt> by the Salt Lake County Di:::;trict Court 
after trial and npon entry of Finding:-; of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law. 
The statements of fact offered by Daine::; an' not 
entirely supported by the record and \\'P should lib, to 
note the following matters which are inconsistent \ritl1 
the facts or not supported by the record: 
A. On page two of Daines' Brief, refrrPnce i;-; 
made to a lost or destroyed written agrePment. No 
written memoranda or other acceptable evidrm•p 
of the employment contract with the partnership 
has been offered or proposed in evidence and no 
lost or destroyed contract has been e::;tablishP<l. 
B. At page two of their brief, Daines claims a 
corporation assumed partnership obligation;-;. 
The maker was never released or substituted. 
Riggle's only remedy is against the Daines for 
payment of the note they executed. 
C. At page three of Daines' Brief, it is claimed 
that Riggle demanded a bonus for making tlw 
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loan. No bonus or inducement has been proved. 
proposed that 3% of gross profits of 
Dain<'s hP applied to pay obligation. Payment 
arrang<'nwnts are only good business. 
D. At page fonr, the Daines' Brief states, "The 
gronn<l was f for a usurious contract." Such 
a statPment is not a fact, not supported by evi-
c1<>nce an<l ('ontrary to the findings of the Judge 
of thP District Court. (R-47,48) 
Tlit· n·stat<·<l faets snpported hy the record are as 
follO\rs: 
On .Jul.': S, 19:J4, Higgl<' loan<'d Daim·s $10,000.00 by 
d(•Jiy,·r:· of his elH·ek ( P-1) and in exchange receivPd a 
prnrnissor>· not<' in tlw arnount of $10,000.00 carrying in-
kn·st payah!P at v; pt>r annum. The }H'Omissory note 
\\a:-: ('Xt·(·ukd h>- (•aeh partiwr - D. R. Daines, R. M. 
Dairn·s and .J. Korman Dain<'s. (P-3) 
Higgl1· was told h:- tlw Daines that they needed 
11101w>- and at thPir n·qtwst made the loan. Riggle in-
nstigat(•<l thP eornpany and lwlieved it had an excellent 
('liane\• for sttf'C'Pss if propPrly managt>d. 
ThPn' wt>re S\'\·Pral cliscussions with the partners on 
tlH· mdhocl for payrnPnt of the loan. All discussions were 
('.On<·(•nwd with payment of the principal of the note on 
a n•gular basis as no installment paynwnt terms were 
('ontairn·<l in tlw note. 
Daim·s and each of them admit the execution of the 
noh·, that tht>ir signatures are genuine, that the promis-
sor:· not<' was not paid, and that the account as itemized 
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by Riggle and stated in the Findings of Facts and Con-
clusions of Law was correct. (R-122) Daines ah;o agreed 
that there is a balance on the note for principal and in-
terest in the amount of $18,963.92 as of Febrnary 11, 
1969. (P-2, P-5, P-6, and D-4) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
NO SUPPLEMENT AL AGREEMENT RELATED TO THE 
EXECUTION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE. 
Daines claim usury from an oral or lost written Pm-
ployment agreement that was created as an induce11H·nt 
to the loan. 
An examination of the evidence and record will not 
support Daines' contention and upholds the trial court's 
Finding of Fact that there was no usurious transaction. 
Daines admit executing the promissory note. DainPs 
did not offer any document or other written proof of any 
written agreement or obligation with Riggle other than 
the promissory note. 
Only one partner testified that there was a writt1·n 
employment agreement entered into at the time of tlw 
making of the note. 
This alleged agreement is Daines basis for the claim 
of usury. D. R. Daines, a partner, testified that he pre-
pared the alleged written agreement on his stated tenm;, 
that he had it in his control, but that it is lost, although 
all other company records are available. 
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Daiiws tlwn tri<·<l to <·stablish the alleged written 
l'Ontraet hy oral <·vi<l<·nc<·. Thc·re are specific, accepted 
pro<·<'dnn•s for introduction of secondary evidence to 
pro\·<' a writing. Daim•s have not even offered to prove 
s<'<·ornlar:·: <·vid<·nc<,, sneh as eopiPs, memorandums, etc. 
of tl1P pnrporkd agn·<·ment. 
of tlu· Pxistem·p of a written agreement 
d<H's not <'stablish an agT<·<'ment. 
Biggl<· has d<'ni<'<l making any othC'r agrPement with 
l>aiiws at the time of tlw loan. (R-1:3, 36) Riggle en-
t<·r<'d into an oraT, month to month employment agree-
111<'nt somP two months after tlw note was executed and 
Ii<' had paid tlw $10,000.00 to Daines. 
Tht>n• ts llO real "'·idt•11c0 of a written employment 
agret'm<'11t hrtwP<'n Dai1ws and Riggle. Daines, as the 
partv <'laiming that a written agreement existed, has the 
ln1nl<·H of pro,·illg- the agn•ement in the absence of pro-
d1wing the original writing. 
Dain<'s must <'Stablish a lost or destroyed document 
Ji.,. d<·ar eom·incing t•videnet>. 
DainPs has not carried the burden required to es-
a lost or dPstroye<l document. A comparison of the 
<·\·idenee adducPd as against tlw required burden of proof 
indicatPs that DainPs has not Pstablished the existence of 
a 11suriom; contract or any other contract. 
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In order to Pstablish the terms of a lost contract, tlw 
following matters must be Pstahlished hy a prepond('l'-
ence of the evidt-nce. (29 Am. Jur.2d E,-idencP, See. 4(i0; 
23A CJS Evidence, Sec. 83G -
A. Original existence of the document. Daines daim-
ed that an employment agreement was lH'PparPd by him-
self on his own terms, but that such an agrePment L'an-
not be found. Daines prepared the alh•ged agreement, 
had control over it and control of the partiwrship rPL'ords 
and cannot locate the agreement, though all otl1l·r n·conb 
are available. Daines does not state whether or not copiPs 
were prepared, a memorandmn made or any other 
ondary evidence available to lH'OVl' the l'xistenee of t11P 
agreement. No other partner substantiated t]w elairnl·d 
agreement. Nothing has been produced to suh:-;tantiatt-
the claim of the existence of the docunwnt and Rigg-IP 
denies existence of any written agreement. 
B. Execution of the original document. Thel'l' is no 
testimony of the matuality of the elainwd writtPn agn•(·-
ment or that Riggle executed any agreement. Dairn·s 
claimed that each of the partners executed the agTeeml•111, 
yet no supporting evidence was adducPd from tht• otlwr 
partners. Riggle denies that lw exeeuted any agTl'l'Itwnt 
with the Daines partnership. 
C. Delivery and acceptance of the document. Dairn·:-: 
testified that he typed the agreement at the officl' of 
Riggle, apparently thereby claiming that there was a 
delivery of the document. Daines said he prepared tlw 
alleged agreement on his own terms, that he had pos-
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sl·ssion of the agn·(•111<·nt and the company's records and 
d tl1is is t1H· only cornpany record that he cannot find. 
'l'IH·n· is no supporting <·vid<·nec· of the delivery of any 
original <·ontraet or of l{iggle's acct>ptance of any written 
En·n assuming that .i\lr. D. R. Daines is truth-
J'ti I \\·]11·n Ii!' says hP prt>pan·d thP docwnent there is no 
1·\·id1·nc·1· of its d<·li\<TY to Riggle or his acceptance there-
of. 111 fad, all th<• ind1·1wndent evidence indicates that 
Higgl<· \\·as <·rnploy(•d substantially aftl>r the date of thP 
note>. (1 1-:'i) (H-±1, 81) 
D. T1·rn1s or eont<'nts of thP agret>rnent. Riggle 
dt>ni1·s tlw eoin('idental \nittt>n agn·ement. There is no 
otl11·r 1Tid<·m·p supporting a written agreemt>nt. No writ-
ti·n eontraet has lw<·n PstahlishPd hy agrt>t>ment among the 
parti1•s. J)ai1ws t<·stifo·d as to certain terms of the alleged 
<·ontrnet, all of ,,·hi<'h WPl'l' d<'nit>d by Riggle. No contract 
\ms pron•d or proffered which was enforceable, by either 
Dai1ws or Riggi<'. 1 f thP eon tract is not sufficiently well 
1·stahlish<'<l to afford Riggi<' a cause of action thereunder, 
th1·n it is not snffieiently well established to 
<'ii use him to forfeit his ten thousand dollars. 
Dain1•s ahont tlw tPrms of the alleged 
agT<·<·nwnt \\·as l'<'eitation ot' a eontract executed over a 
y1·ar at'tPr thP making of the loan (R-113, 114). The con-
t nwt n·frJTPd to was a eon tract hPhn-•t>n Mr. Riggle and 
a <·orporation (DainPs l\Ianufactnring Company, Inc.) a 
<·0111pletel:' difforPnt legal from the partnership 
and not a to action. (D-7) 
HigglPs admits tlw Pxecntion of an employment con-
t rad \\·ith a eorporation a after he had paid the 
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partnership $10,000 and dPnies any other written agrPP-
ment. 
Daines did not relate the two employnu--nt contracts. 
The corporation willingly entered into the employ-
ment agreement a year after the loan to the partnerioihi1J. 
The trial judge heard the evidence from all wit-
nesses and made a finding of fact that the loan was thP 
only agreement between the parties at the time Riggl<•;; 
paid $10,000 to the partnership. (R-47) The finding of 
fact is supported by clear and convincing evidence. ( P-:), 
P-1, P-5) (R-74, 97, 100) 
E. The loss, disappearance or destruction of tlu· 
document. Daines testified simply that he was unable to 
find the agreement or any secondary t>Yiden('e of thf· 
claimed agreement although the conipany boob and 
records were available. He did not state the proc<·<lun·:-: 
or methods, if any, he used to attempt to find any docu-
ment. He gave no explanation of its possible disappear-
ance other than it could not be found. There was no sup-
porting eYidence of any loss or destruction. Daines had 
control of and was able to provide all other ('Ompan:-· 
records (R-112, 113) The testimony of record is not sub-
stantial nor clear and convincing that a search was made 
for any lost document or that the purported docuuwnt 
ever, in fact, existed. 
Proof of the alleged lost document is not l'stablislwd 
by testimony of the parties. Mr. Riggle emphatieally 
denied several times in his testimony that there was an 
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aµ;i·(·(•nwnt wit11 the Ddt·ndants at the time of the loan 
:w) 
Higgl1· stakd that there were discussion with 
('<t<'li J)!'frndant partrn·r regarding ways of paying the 
not1·s, both 11is proposals and proposals of 
t!H' partrn·rs. ln addition, there was a discussion of 
\1·lwtlll'r or not Higgle would be employed as a con-
for th1• partnership. These discussions were not 
aµ;n•(•J11(•nts at tlw time of the execution of the promissory 
not(•. (H- 7±, 79, SO, Sl, 9±, 99, 98) 
Ill Harcroft u;. Li cacich, 3;) C.A.2d 710, 96 P.2d 951, 
(19:m), the Court stated that" ... the burden of 
provi11g tlw fact m·e1•ssarily earries with it more than 
tl1P usual 1111•as1irP of responsibility ... "to establish the 
('(J!lt1·nts of a lost instrm1wnt. The Court stated further 
that thP evidt>net· must show, without reasonable doubt, 
tlH· substantial parts uf the claimed lost instrument, 
..... the t1•stirnony of the witm·ss ne-ed not be accepted 
as tn1P, rn<'rc·ly twaust• thPI·e is no direct evidence to con-
tnHliet it, as e\·idPnce may, within itself bear the ear-
rnarks of falsity." 
\Yht>ther or not evidenct> in any particular case es-
tablishes the instnunPnt by clear, satisfactory and con-
vin<'ing evidence should be left to the trial court based 
llpon tlu• faets presented to him by the various witnesses 
,,·JwsP ('l't>dihility and clrnwanor it had an opportunity 
to ohsPITP. The Court may bl'lieve one, many or all of the 
witnessps or nonl-' of the witne8ses, but it makes the de-
t(•nnination. \Yhen thNt> is substantial evidence in the 
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record to support the Judge's findings on whether or 
not there is such an agreement, the Court's finding 0 11 
the question of the agreenwnt should sustained. Vo11 
Hasseln vs. Von Hasseln, 122 C.A. 2d 7, 264 P.2d 20!1 
(1953); Chichester vs. Seymour, 28 C.A. 2d G9G, 83 P.2d 
301 (1938); Gooch i:s. Rodeu:ald, 432 P.2d 755, Colo-
rado, ( 1967). 
The Trial Court considered the testimony of t!iP 
discussions and made the findings that they were dis-
cussions only. (R-47, Findings 7 & 8). The Court found 
that there was no other agreement or usury betwt>en thP 
parties at the time of making the loan. (R-47, Finding S). 
The Trial Court did conclude that Riggle was employt>d 
by Daines two months after the loan and the month to 
month unilateral employment agreement had no relation-
ship to an inducement for the loan (R-13, JS, 19, 33, 3G) 
The Trial Court heard all evidPnce of the existPncP 
of the purported agreement and found that no agTP('-
rnent existed at the making of the loan. The Finding is 
supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record 
and the Trial 1Court should be upheld. (P-1, P-3, P-5) 
(R-47,48, 74, 79,80,81,94,98, 100, 112, 113) 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH A USURIOUS 
TRANSACTION. 
The only proven and admitted written agreenwnt 
between the parties to this action is the Promissory N ok 
dated July 8, 1954, for $10,000. ( P-3) 
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Daines <·rnploy<·d HigglP on ] , 1954, on 
a month to month oral agn·euwnt. The first payment of 
salar!· was S<·pkrnher 1 G, 1954. Social Security tax and 
\ritld1olding tax W<'re d<'ducfrd from the gross amount of 
t)H• ('h1·ek. (P-5) 
Tlw on!!· <·rnploy11wnt agreement was a month to 
month arrang<·uwnt lwtm•<•n Riggle and Daines (R-74, 
Daines ,-oluntarily hired Riggle. The loan had been 
rnack and DainPs usPd tlw funds (R-16). Riggle could 
not c·0111pel Dain<·s to hir1_• him. Tlw employment had no 
relationship to the loan. (R-47, 74, 97, 79, 80, 81) 
,\s th<' trial judge found there was discussion of an 
1·111plo!·rn<>nt arrangPlllPnt between the parties, both prior 
to and snhsequPnt to the Joan, but the employment was 
a sqiarat<' agreement eonsurnmated after the loan, and 
ltad no n•lationship to tlw loan. (R-49) 
A bonus or commission agreement for a loan must 
lw a part of the loan arrangement at the inception of 
the loan and be compensation for use of the borrowed 
funds to he incorporatPd into the loan transaction and 
to he usurious. The men· identity of parties to alleged 
and irnpron'd agn•prnents an· insufficient to taint a prior 
tram-action with usury. (91 CJS l'sury, See. 61) 
In a l'PCPnt rtah case, United-American Life Insur-
111/('(' Company cs. Wif.lcy, 21 Ftah 2d 279, 444 P.2d 755, 
(19GS) tlw Court determined that no usury was involve,<l 
\\-hl're tlw Dt>f Pndant deposited certain amounts with the 
Plaintiff from loan procPPds. Some of the deposits were 
a ho nus or finders fee for the loan and some of the de-
11 
posit ,,-as for excess payment in c:uw of dl'f'anlt. Th(· 
Court stated that in deh1rmining thP qm1:stion of nsmy, 
the entire agreement must he C'Onsidt'red as it exiskd in 
the inception of the loan agrePmPnt. 
A k:st was put forth in th<' U11itcd-A/ll('ricun ca:se to 
determine whether or not the surrounding 
make the agreement usurious. ''If tlwre is a promisP to 
pay a contingent sum which should makP tlw agreenwnt 
usurious, it still would not be mrnrious if the contingeney 
is one which is under the control of the borrower. On th<· 
other hand, if the borrower cannot control a contingenc:-·, 
then the contract would be usurious if th<c> amount prom-
ised to be paid as interest is great<c>r than that allowed by 
law. The contingency must be a part of the agrt'enwnt 
with the lender in order to taint the transaction witl1 
usury." 
In the case in hand, Daines claim usury hecausP of 
the loan and a subsequent agreement by th<> partnershi l' 
employing Riggle. The contingency of employing Rigglt> 
was entirely under the control of the Daines. Riggle had 
no control over the contingency and no writkn agre<'-
ment, no right to demand employment, no right to df'-
mand any other payments, no right of recourse on tlw 
failure of the Daines to employ him and no right to dP-
ci<u·p dd'ault in tlw loan upon failure to pay salary or to 
"mploy l1im. 
Higglt> liad no right to maintain his employment once 
( ·111 ploy<'<l. 
Higgl1· had an agn'1·ment to lw paid $10,000.00 on the 
maturity datP of the promissory note. A later consurnated 
Plllployment agreement was not part. of the loan agree-
11wnt at thP inct>ption of tlw loan. 
Higglt> did not commence employment for Daines 
1mtil SPptPillb(,r 1, 1954, two months after the promissory 
PXPcution. Daines now trit>s to relate their voluntary 
agT1'1·1rn·nt baf'k to tlw time of making the promissory 
notP and clainu; that the Daines were compelled to pay 
for two obligations. 
Dairn·s and Riggle could contract for as many sep-
arate obligations as they desired and as long as the 
obligations are not compensation one for the other, usury 
<'annot he elaiml:'d by Daines. 
Tht> ruh· that must exist at the inception of 
tliP loan has bt,en upheld by numerous cases. Two notable 
<·ases \\·ith similar factual situations where the Supreme 
( 'onrt uplwld the Trial Courts detennined that there was 
11ot usurious trm1saction are the Goldenzwig and Knoll 
<·asPs herPaftt>r citt'd. 
Both cases invoh·l:'d payments to the lender by the 
borrower the payments required on the face of 
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the instrmm'nt. In both cases, the pay11wnts WP]'(• addi-
tional com1wnsation for the lender. ThP Court found th(· 
payments not n·lated to the loan. The Court also fournl 
the payments by tlw bolTO\\"l•rs \\'Pl'<' Yoluntary and W(·n· 
not nsnriou::; intPrest extratkd or recein·d lwcaus(• thP 
additional pay1m•nts \\'Pl'l' not agn·Pd to at the ineqltion 
of the loan. 
The Court held that " ... a contract i::s not usurious 
where it doe::s not in its inception rP<1uire pa_\1ll<'nb whi('l1 
are usuriOlrn, en'n though s1m1s an• snhsf'qrn·ntly paid 
hy the obligor to the ohligee as bonuses, \\·hich coupk·<l 
with the interest paid amount to a smn in excr>ss of tlH· 
legal rate of interest." Goldn1::1cig i·s. Sh(/ddock, 31 C.A. 
2d 719, 722, SS P.2d 93:1, 934, (193-1). SP<> also K11oll cs. 
Schle11ss11cr, 112 C.A. 2d S7G, 2-17 P.:2d ::no, ( 19;)'.Z). 
The Court in the Golde11z1rig ca::sl' statl·cl that eon-
tract which in its inception i::s unaffrcte>d by mrnry ('HJl 
never be invalidated b.'· an.'- suhse<itwnt usuriou:-; trans-
action. 
The Goldeizzwig facts are similar to thi::s '1]11· 
borrower made substantial bonus pa_\11wnts in eonjnnc-
tion with the quarterly interest pay11wnts while paying 
very small principal payments. Tlw L;ourt deh•nnirn·d 
that the bonus payments wen• entirt>ly Yoluntary by tlw 
borrower. 
In the case at hand, there was no usury m tlt(' in-
ception of the loan. The salary pa,nm•nts made lat(•r to 
Riggle resulted from a later ind(•ppnclent negotiation. 
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Tlw agn•(•111<·11t to hin· Higgl<· <lo<·s not n·late back to the 
i1w(·ption of tlH· loan. 
"\11otl1('J' fad elairn('d hy Daines as ::;upporting usury 
1s tliat Higgl(' was irn·x1H·ril'nced in their business and 
tlwrdon· <·oitld not n·nder effrctin• service to Daines. 
It Iliad<· 110 diffrn·neP to partnership \\'hether or not 
l{iggl<' had (•x1wri<'llC'<' in tlH·ir particular line of work 
fw('aUs<' their eornpany\ Jll'oduet was unique (R-78, 105, 
117. 118). Higgk· \Yas <>xrwriPnc<>d in business and was 
alil(' to i111part th<' lwndit of his l'XJwril·nce accumulated 
()\'('J' .")O Y('(ll'S. 
Dairn·s ('lai1rn·d as another basis for usury that the 
1·1nploy1rn•nt eontraet (D-7) lwtw<>Pn Higgle and Daines 
:\[anufaeturing Corn pan:·, l nc. is also connected with 
part1wrship loan, although <'X('cukd more than one year 
aft(·r thP loan and lwt\n•Pn diffrrent parties. 
Dairn·s partnPrs disaffirm a::;smnption of corporate 
obligations, (D-7, P-:3) and yet claim the contract relates 
to th<· timP of thP loan tran::;action and claims involve-
lll('nt of all parties at the incPption of the loan. 
Such a conclusion eannot be drawn logically or 
!(·gaily from tlw fad;;. 
Tlw corporation was organized six and one-half 
nwnths aftl'r tlw partnPrnhip loan. (R-105). The corpora-
tion Pmploym<"nt agrel'ment was l'xecuted over one year 
aftl'r thl' loan and six months aftpr the birth of the cor-
poration. ( D-7) PartiPs not in Pxistence at the inception 
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of thl• loan could not havP agn'l'lllPnts prior to its ('X-
it-ltence. The latkr born party cannot havP its 
and agrPemenb relate to third iiart:· agn•(•11wnts eon-
summated prior to existence. 
In Gre<'n!Jcr!J cs. Jlaugwu'sl', 3!J 2d 
P.2d lEl±, ( 1951), the Court stakd ..... the rnl!' is that 
a bonus giv1c•n or paid h:· a stranger to a contract of loan 
for his own puq>osps or reasons to induc!' thP making of 
;-;uch contract b:· the lender dot's not rnak<._. tlw contrad 
usurious." 
In the Greenberg case, a p(-'rson owned stoek and 
it to a lendl•r if the lender would loan tlw morn•y to 
a borrower, a different Pntit:--· from tlw owner of th(· 
stock. The Court reasoned that the subject transaction 
could not be usurious because the person owning th1· 
stock had the entire control and ownership and right to 
d<'tl'I"rninP the disposition of that stock without thP con-
trol of the borrower, and he was not cmnp<·llPd to plPdg"(' 
the stock. The Court concluded tl1at the agree11wnt is not 
usurious as it does not relate to the inception of tlw loan. 
Here Riggle was voluntaril:--· paid by DainPs and 
neither entity was compelled to hin· Riggi<'. Dainr·:' 
could have terminatPd em1Jloyment at any timP. 
Any agrP€ments occurring aftt>r th<· datP of the 
promissory note could not lw related to the time of tlw 
loan transaction so as to tai11t the loan as a usurious 
transaction. The loan was a single trawmction arnl eom-
plete by itself at the time made. 
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POINT III 
EVEN ASSUMING AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WAS 
EXECUTED, THIS DOES NOT CREATE USURY. 
Tl11· Trial ( 'ourt round that no (-"lllploymPnt contract 
\\·a:-: in <·xi:-:t\•ne\' at th<' tim<· tlw promissory note was ex-
1·1·11k<l. (H--1-7, Finding-:-: 7 &. S) Assmning that such a 
1·ontract ha<l h<·<·n l'Stahlislwd, this in ih;pJf would not be 
The fact is that Daines did Pmploy Riggle at a 
lat1·r tirn" and failf'd to follow his managl'ment sugges-
tions and fail<'d in their hnsinPss. (P-5, R-98, llG, 124) 
l t is furtlH·r obvious that if Riggle did not or could 
not lH'rfonn his part of the employment contract, the 
1 111plo:•<·r could tPnninat<· th<· sanw for cause and avoid 
a<ldi tional tlH·re1rnd<>r and, therefore, the wage 
m·n· not uneonditionally required. Services 
1nust lw pNfonned in ord<·r to Parn payment. Three-days 
<·onsnltation "·pn• n·qnirPd iwr month for a retainer of 
or $.);).00 pcr day to aLh·ise at a business located 
in a distant city. This is hardly an l'xorbitant rate. 
POINT IV 
THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT THE DEFENDANT'S 
CONTENTIONS. 
Sen•ral cases arl' cited by Daines to support their 
position \mt Pxamina ti on of tlwsP casl'S in di ca te that th<::>y 
do not apply to tlw cas<::> at bar. 
Ln tlw Aspcitia rs. California Tru.st case 158 C.A. 
:2<1 150, 322 ( 1953) tht> promissory notes were 
issrn>d for an amount in PXCt>Ss of the amount 
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advaneP<l. Thc•n•ai'tc·r in ordPr to pa:· t11P usurious loan 
the dPhtor bono\n•d tlw full amount from a third part.\· 
to pay tlw original lPndl'l". rl'his ease· is elc•arly a <'as<' of 
usm·:· and is elearl:· not applicabl<' to th<' instant ea:-:<'s. 
In tlw casPs of Riclwnlso11 rs. Fosfrr, d 11!, 100 
·wash. 57, 170 Pac. 3:21 and TVcsf1111111 1·s. Dy<·, 21-! ('al. 
28, 4P.2d 1:34: ( U>:31) \n•n_• actions on r<'ll<'\\·:.tl tra11:-:ac·-
tions lwtwePn idPntical partic·s. 11 lw eontinuit:· of trans-
action was apparent and all docunwnts \H•re hefon· tlH· 
Court. 
In Gra1111is l'.'i. Stnens 111 N.E. :!(i:) York) and 
Cmrner Airlines, !11c. rs. Ariation Credit Corporntin11. 
:280 F.:2d 895, (5th Circuit), \\Tittrn ag-r<'<'lll<'nb \\'c•n· lH·-
for<:> the Court and tlw Courts lll('l'<'ly intnpr<'t<·d tl1t· 
written agn'<'llHc'nb. ThPn' \\·as no quPstion as to t1H· 1·<111-
tinuity of tlw parties. In tlH.' Co1111cr <·asp tlw transadion 
became usurious \dwn an nrn·ons<·ionahlt· amount \Ya:-: 
charg<'d to PXtPnd thP dm· dak. No sneh ;.;itnation 1·xi:-:tc: 
in tlw instant c<isP. 
The case ofRiq[Jle rs. 1Jai11es Jla1111f11ct11ri11q Colil-
pany, Inc., 20 Utah 2d 391, 4:)8 J>.:2d SOS ( 19(i8) is a eac:1· 
bt>twePn the Plaintiff and the• eorporation, that sn<'<'<'<'<frd 
to the Daines operatiom;, 1-1 hP Distriet Court grant(•d 
Riggle a summary judgnH·nt whirh was app<'al<'d and 
this Court rP\'Nsed on tlw hasis that furth<T ('Vid(·n1·1• 
should taken. Tlwr<> was no ruling r<>lating to tlw 
issues of this case. 
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C'()XCl,USlON 
Hiµ;µ;I<· ha:-: olitainPd a judh1111<•nt against a partrn'r-
:-:hip and hrn or th<· indi\·id11al parhwrn for tlw balance 
d1w on a prn111i:-::-:ory not<·. Dairn·:-: attl'mpt<·d to t'Stahlish 
a <·oineid<·ntal agT<'<'lll<'nt with the promissory note and 
tliat u:-:11ry n·:-:ttlt<·d from the additional agr<:>emt·nt. No 
()ri.i2:i11al agT<'<'lll<·nt \nu-; introdu(·<·d or proffrrt>d, Daines 
in:-:t<'ad n·I.' inµ; 011 oral t<':-:tilllony. 
11 avinµ; fail<·d to <·stahli:-:h a ('Oineidental agreement, 
Dai1w:-: Jl<•xt att<'lll)Jt to eharactt•riz<' an agreem1c•nt with a 
<·orporation whi('h was forn1<'d aft<•r tlw promissory note 
and th<· aµ;n·Plll<'nt 1·x<·c11kd om· y<'ar afkr tl11c• note to 
:-:0111d1ow lw<·om<' a part of th<' original promissor.'· note. 
Tiu· parti<·:-: in th<· ('orporation \nTe different from 
tlH· parti<·:-: in tlw partiwr:-:hip and th<'r<:> was no continuity 
()r parti<·:-: m11onµ; all th<· daim<'d agn'<'lll<'nt:::; and nott>s. 
Tlwn· \Ya:-: no ohliµ;ation lwt\\"<•1•11 Riggle and DainPs for 
tl11· 1·xPcution of an.'· oth<>r agI"<'<'llll'nt nor opportunity for 
Hig-i.d<· to <'nfon·1• any aµ;n·<'lll<'nts against Daines other 
tlian thl' not1·. 
Th<·n· i:-: m·<·rwhPlming- evidl'nCP in t}H• record to 
:-:llpport thP Firnlinµ;s of Faet and Conclusions of Law 
dd<·n11i1wd h.'· tlw Trial Court, and the ,Judgment of that 
( 'ourt in favor of Riggle against Daines should be af-
t'i l'Jll<•d. 
Res1wctfull.'· :-:uhmittt•d, 
Bielt•, JonPs & Murphy, and 
\Y .• J pffrry Fillmore 
AttornPys for Plaintiffs and 
Respond<'n ts 
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